Featured Articles

By Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco
Non-Resident Research Fellow, Ateneo School of Government
08 February 2021

The broader question here is how will the status quo affect the normalization process mandated by the BOL and the CAB. Basically, what will happen to the peace process once the 3-year transition period ends? It is worth remembering at this point that the peace process involves two tracks, normalization and political transition. It has been argued that pursuing both tracks should never be about prioritizing one over the other. Indeed, the prevailing view treats both as parallel pursuits. But while they are intricately related with each other, it is not a given that they should be pursued in perfect cadence.

By Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco
Non-Resident Research Fellow, Ateneo School of Government
01 February 2021

However, it cannot be emphasized enough that when the Bangsamoro electorate ratified the BOL in 2019, they had the clear intention and expectation of voting for their very first parliament in 2022. Therefore, it only seems fair for the Bangsamoro electorate to have a say over an amendatory law which postpones the election of the inaugural Bangsamoro Parliament to 2025.

By Atty. Emilio Marañon III
Research Fellow, Access Bangsamoro
28 January 2021

It must be understood that the BOL is not an ordinary legislation that can be amended following the regular process of law-making. The text of the BOL have been approved by an overwhelming majority of Bangsamoro voters voting in the January 21, 2019 plebiscite. It is thus a very persuasive argument that the sitting BTA and Congress cannot unilaterally alter or change its ratified provisions without having the changes likewise ratified by the people of the Bangsamoro. This view is hinged on that simple logic that to amend this agreement would require the same power that put it into effect. This argument is further strengthened by the fact, that per the phrasing of the plebiscite question itself, what has been ratified was not just the creation of the BARMM, but the BOL as a law itself.

By Hansley A. Juliano
Instructor, Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University
Version as of 17 September 2020

The 2022 polls herald a momentous occasion due to the pioneering parliamentary elections of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) on May 9. Calls for preparation for the BARMM parliamentary polls have already been sounded. We must note that parliamentary elections, by the nature of its institutional setup, expect that political parties are consolidated and animated by a common and explicitly-stated policy agenda. In a way, the institutional design seems to be the perceived panacea for the heavily-personalistic and clan-based politics of the region. That said, the nature of elections in the Bangsamoro has hardly been defined by long-term political party and genuine democratic institution-building.

By Rizal G. Buendia, PhD
Independent Political Analyst and Consultant, Southeast Asian Politics and International Development
24 August 2020

The innate tribal divisions and rivalries among the Bangsamoros need to be substantially reduced, hence transforming conflict into a cooperative arrangement that will eventually build the Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation). Given the diversity of the region, the BTA has to be prepared in addressing the multi-faceted issues, concerns, and problems not only of the Muslim population but also of the non-Muslim, non-Christian indigenous groups (commonly referred to as the Lumads), as well as Christian communities in the region.

By Ralph Chester D. Retamal
Researcher, Access Bangsamoro
25 August 2020

Last July 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Republic Act (RA) No. 11054, commonly known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), effectively replacing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the new Bangsamoro region (Corrales, 2018).  The law is a product of decades-long peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The BOL introduces a new government and electoral system which has the potential to bring long-standing peace to the region.

By Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco
Non-resident Research Fellow, Access Bangsamoro
July 23, 2020

The Bangsamoro Parliament is quite peculiar because it does not mirror the form of government at the national level. By and large, other subnational governments in Southeast Asia are simply copies of their national governments. For instance, state governments in Malaysia are parliamentary in form like the federal government. But the Bangsamoro regional government is mandated by law to be parliamentary in form even though the Philippine national government is presidential.

Obviously, setting up a parliamentary government essentially from scratch brings different degrees of difficulty. But one complexity which can prove to be truly daunting for the BTA and the Bangsamoro people pertains to the central role of political parties in parliamentary elections and governance.

By Atty. Emilio Marañon III
Research Fellow, Access Bangsamoro
July 14, 2020

In further pursuit of the aspiration of self-governance in the BARMM, the peoples of the Bangsamoro are set to elect their own parliamentary officials in a free and democratic region-wide election to be held on May 09, 2020. This election is crucial not only because it will test the readiness of the peoples of the BARMM for “self-governance,” but it is an opportunity to quell the doubts of those who believe otherwise.

By Hansley Juliano, M.A.
Instructor, Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University
28 May 2020

One significant innovation in Philippine institutional design created by the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) would be the enactment of a regional parliamentary structure—a form of government which skews closer to the empowerment of legislative institutions over executive and judicial ones. Classical arguments in favor of parliamentary forms of government tend to extol the fact that a) it is adopted widespread by most governments, and b) that the fusion of executive and legislative powers can create stronger and stable governments.

At the same time, parliamentary governments have also been observed to either create “over-mighty” heads of government, as well become subject to unstable coalitional regimes. In particular, scholars like  Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart have warned that “in the short term switching to parliamentary government without effecting parallel changes to encourage greater party discipline could prove problematic”. As is borne out of the contentious history of introducing parliamentarism to the Philippines, its adoption tends to be coloured by the political intentions of the proponents of such—especially when they are identified with long-standing elite interests. Thus, the potential political ramifications in an (as of yet) not wholly reformed BARMM, however, remain very salient.

By Millard O. Lim, M.A.
Part-Time Faculty of Political Science Department, Ateneo de Manila University
November 13, 2019

Article IV, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 11054, otherwise known as the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), states in explicit terms that “the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have a parliamentary form of government.” This is repeated in Article VIII, Section 1 on the appointment of the Wali: “Consistent with a parliamentary form of government, there shall be a Wali who shall serve as the ceremonial head of the Bangsamoro Government.”

By Lewis Hawke
Lead Governance Specialist
World Bank, Philippines
September 16, 2019

As the deadline for Britain’s exit from the EU approaches, it makes me think of how fortunate we are in the Philippines to be able to resolve citizens’ desire for greater autonomy and self-determination through an orderly process, underpinned by a detailed law, and goodwill amongst stakeholders.

Instead of proposing withdrawing from the union, like UK, the Bangsamoro people have voted to “remain” and pursue their goals as an integral part of the Philippines Republic. This does not necessarily make the decisions or the transition any easier. In fact, there are many challenges for the people and the parliament of Bangsamoro. I would like to focus on just a few, with emphasis on financial management.

By Atty. Laisa Masuhud Alamia, CESE
Minority Leader and Member of Parliament
Bangsamoro Transition Authority
06 September 2019

The enactment of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (RA 11054) promises a stronger regional autonomy for the Bangsamoro. At its core, the law provides a new fiscal arrangement that vests an increased degree of fiscal autonomy to the Bangsamoro Government. It has expanded the sources of revenues to be tapped by the Government primarily through the annual block grant. This allows an automatic transfer from the national government equivalent to five percent (5%) of the net national internal revenue tax collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the net collection of the Bureau of Customs from the third fiscal year immediately preceding the current fiscal year. As a result, it has given the Bangsamoro Government an expanded authority over its appropriations. This means that it now has the power to pass its annual appropriations law, departing from the previous approach of submitting it to Congress for review and approval. With this new arrangement, the needs of the Bangsamoro community will be addressed in a more immediate manner with a wider resource.

By Hon. Engr. Baintan Adil Ampatuan
Member, Bangsamoro Transition Authority
August 30, 2019

It may be said that the budgetary process that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) had to go through annually was contrary to the idea of autonomy. For indeed, it is incredible how an entity can achieve the essence of self-rule when its exercise of fiscal power is subject to certain procedures requiring close coordination with, if not the approval of the national government. Fortunately, this issue has been addressed in the passage of Republic Act No. 11054 or the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL).